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I CONTRIBUTI PROPOSTI ALLA RIVISTA PER LA PUBBLICAZIONE VENGONO ASSEGNATI DAL SISTEMA INFORMATICO A DUE VALUTATORI, SORTEGGIATI ALL'INTERNO DI UN ELENCO DI ORDINARI, ASSOCIATI E RICERCATORI IN MATERIE GIURIDICHE, ESTRATTI DA UNA LISTA PERIODICAMENTE SOGGETTA A RINNOVAMENTO.

I CONTRIBUTI SONO ANONIMIZZATI PRIMA DELL'INVIO AI VALUTATORI. LE SCHEDE DI VALUTAZIONE SONO INVIATE AGLI AUTORI PREVIA ANONIMIZZAZIONE.

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SEDE DELLA REDAZIONE

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Regulatory competition in European company law. Where do we stand twenty years after *Centros*?

SUMMARY*: 1. Introduction. – 2. Freedom of establishment of companies in the EEC Treaty between incorporation theory and real seat theory. – 3. The American market for corporate charters. – 4. The case law of the European Court of Justice. – 5. The European market for company law in the last 20 years. – 5.1. The demand side. – 5.2. The supply side. – 6. Conclusions.

1. Introduction

The twentieth anniversary of the important judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the *Centros* case of 9 March 1999 is an opportunity to reassess this decision² and, more importantly, its impact on developments of freedom of establishment in the European Union.³

This article has an overview character, presenting the issue of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies from the beginning of the European “adventure” and the development of regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition in company law in the

* I thank Peter Agstner and Federico M. Mucciarelli for helpful comments on a previous version of this article. I remain responsible for all possible mistakes. Research project (*The law of close corporations in the broader European regulatory competition: A View from the Euregio*) financed by EGTC European Region Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino, Science Fund: IPN 3-G16.

¹ Case C-212/97, of 9 March 1999. The Author started his Ph.D. in *Economic Analysis of Law* at the DFG Graduate College in *Law and Economics* of the University of Hamburg in October 1998 and decided from the outset to focus his dissertation on the topic of regulatory competition in company law in the European Community, presenting the dissertation topic in November 1998. The topic, ambitious but probably not so relevant, gained momentum precisely with the important decision of *Centros* of March 1999; see S. LOMBARDO, *Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the European Community: Prerequisites and Limits*, Frankfurt am Main, 2002.

² In this article the terms company and company law and corporation and corporate law are used with the same meaning.

EU in the last twenty years.⁴ It then provides a short assessment of the actual market for company law with a specific consideration of close corporations, taking ownership costs vs contracting costs as a paradigm of analysis.⁵ Indeed, contrary to the US benchmark model, in Europe the phenomenon of mobility of companies has involved almost exclusively close corporations and in particular private limited liability companies, with some sporadic exemptions related to listed companies.⁶ Given this pattern, the analysis will show that, twenty years after *Centros*, the situation in the EU differs considerably from the United States. A US style market for corporate charters for listed corporations with dispersed ownership will probably not develop in Europe in the future.⁷

The conclusion is that *Centros* had the positive effect of reconsidering the philosophy of harmonization of company law in

³ The topic of freedom of establishment of companies in a context of possible regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition has proved to be extensively studied in Europe with a burgeoning literature over the last twenty years. Limiting the overview to the literature in English and without any claims of exhaustiveness see e.g., E.-M. KIENINGER, *The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on Company Mobility: EU and US Compared*, in *German Law Journal*, 2004, p. 741 ff.; J. ARMOUR, *Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition*, in ECGI Law WP 54/2005; M. GELTER, *The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law*, in *Journal of Corporate Law Studies*, 2005, p. 247 ff.; W. SCHÖN, *The Mobility of Companies in Europe and the Organizational Freedom of Company Founders*, in *European Company and Financial Law Review*, 2006, p. 122 ff.; M. VENTORUZZO, *Cost-Based and Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets for Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U.*, in *New York University Journal of Law and Business*, 2006, p. 91 ff.; L. ENRIQUES, M. GELTER, *How the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law*, in *Tulane Law Review*, 2007, p. 577 ff.; F.M. MUCCIARELLI, *The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the E.U.*, in *Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2012, pp. 421 ff.

⁴ See already S. LOMBARDO, *op. cit.* and Section 3.

⁵ They refer to the cases of FIAT-Chrysler, FCA (and Ferrari), which became Dutch companies, see F. PERNAZZA, *Fiat Chrysler Automobiles and the New Face of Corporate Mobility in Europe*, in *European Company and Financial Law Review*, 2017, p. 37 ff.

⁶ A useful and complete overview of the legal situation in Europe and for the single Member States is provided by C. GERNER-BEUERLE, F.M. MUCCIARELLI, E. SCHUSTER, M. SIEMS, *The Private International Law of Companies in Europe*, München, 2019.

Europe and making all the actors more aware of the *pro* and *contra* of such a device to reach the goal of an integrated internal market (Article 3.3 EU Treaty).⁸ More importantly, *Centros* served as a very simple but at the same time very incisive device, decided by the ECJ as “motor of European integration”,⁹ (i) to eradicate the very deep fears anchored on and defended by the real seat theory followed by some Member States against “(EU)-foreign” companies, and as result (ii) to affirm the relevance of the country of origin principle and the mutual recognition principle, already applied in other areas of law, also in the field of company law.¹⁰ The mentioned fears were exaggerated both with respect to the protection of shareholders and the protection of creditors and no longer justified in the European internal market context of Article 3.3 EU Treaty.¹¹ At the same time, more recently the issue of creditors’ protection has gained new momentum with the *Kornhaas* case of the ECJ.¹² This case has reconsidered the relationship between company law and insolvency law, making the regulatory picture at the same time easier but more difficult to evaluate.¹³ In this context, also the extent to which Brexit will impact on freedom of establishment (and

⁷ See L. ENRIQUES, M. GATTI, *The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the European Union*, in *U. Pa. Journal of International Economic Law*, 2006, p. 939 ff.; L. ENRIQUES, *EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are?* in *U. Pa. Journal of International Economic Law*, 2006, p. 1 ff.; more recently, L. ENRIQUES, *A Harmonized European Company Law: Are We There Already?* in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 2017, p. 763 ff.

⁸ T. HORSLEY, *Reflections on the Role of the Court of Justice as the “Motor” of European Integration: Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2013, p. 931 ff.

⁹ See C. BEHME, *The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Internal Market With Special Regard to the Cross-Border Mobility of Companies*, in *European Company and Financial Law Review*, 2016, p. 31 ff.; K.E. SØRENSEN, *The Country-of-Origin Principle and Balancing Jurisdiction between Home Member States and Host Member States*, in *European Business Law Review*, 2019, p. 38 ff.

¹⁰ But see K.E. SØRENSEN, *The Fight against Letterbox Companies in the Internal Market*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2015, p. 85 ff., for an attempt to distinguish between compatible and incompatible letterbox companies in the context of freedom of establishment.

¹¹ Case C-594/14 of 10 December 2015.

¹² *Kornhass* concerned a UK limited liability company operating in Germany.

on insolvency proceedings) is dependent on the way the exit will materialize.¹⁴

The liberal case law of the ECJ in the recent past accompanied by the economic and financial crisis after 2008 has led the European Commission to reconsider its action policy in the field of company law, which includes listed companies and close companies.¹⁵ Probably for this reason, the recent “mobility package” of the European Commission is a minimal attempt to try to regulate only the issue of freedom of establishment in terms of reincorporations of private limited companies.¹⁶

The article is structured as follows. After providing in Section 2 a short overview of the relevant issues at stake in the case of freedom of establishment of companies in the European Community (Union), Section 3 briefly analyses the market for corporate charters for the United States for comparative purposes. Section 4 provides an overview of the development of the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the field of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies among Member States. Section 5 concentrates on a short assessment of the evolution of the European market for company law from the demand and supply side perspective. Section 6 concludes.

¹³ The Brexit decision and its possible effects on freedom of establishment are discussed by J. ARMOUR, H. FLEISCHER, V. KNAPP, M. WINNER, *Brexit and Corporate Citizenship*, in ECGI Law WP 340/2017.

¹⁴ J. ARMOUR, W.-G. RINGE, *European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2011, p. 125 ff.

¹⁵ The recent Commission proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions (Com(2018) 241 final of 25.4.2018) in the context of the so-called Company Law Package (together with the Commission’s proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2017/1132 as regards the use of digital tools and processes in company law (Com(2018) 239 final of 25.4.2018)) also includes the possibility to transfer the registered office with change of applicable law and retention of legal personality. Nevertheless, the proposal applies only to limited liability companies. For a first assessment of the proposal, see J. SCHMIDT, *The Mobility Aspect of the EU Commission’s Company Law Package: Or – ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’*, in *European Company Law*, 2019, p. 13 ff. See also C. GERNER-BEUERLE, F.M. MUCCIARELLI, E. SCHUSTER, M. SIEMS, *Cross-border reincorporations in the European Union: the case for comprehensive harmonization*, in *Journal of Corporate Law Studies*, 2018, p. 1 ff.

2. Freedom of establishment of companies in the EEC Treaty between incorporation theory and real seat theory

At the beginning of the European adventure, the relevant Articles in the area of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies were articles 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty, Article 54(3)(g) EEC Treaty on harmonization of company law as well as Article 293(3) EEC Treaty on mutual recognition of companies, retention of legal personality and mergers between European companies.¹⁷ While Article 52 EEC Treaty provided for freedom of establishment for individuals, Article 58 EEC Treaty extended freedom of establishment also to companies (in terms of for-profit entities).¹⁸

Article 58 EEC Treaty, extending freedom of establishment also to companies that have their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community, was interpreted according to national rules. In the field of private international law for companies, Member States have traditionally followed either the real seat theory or the incorporation theory. The real seat theory requires the (Member) State of the registered office and of the real seat (central administration or principal place of business) for formation and recognition purposes to coincide, while the incorporation theory allows for the registered office and real seat to be in two different (Member) States.¹⁹

¹⁶ Article 293 EEC Treaty (Article 220 EC Treaty) is no longer present in the EU Treaties. For the early literature on the relevant Treaty Articles, see Y. SCHOLTEN, *Company Law in Europe*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 1967, p. 377 ff.; M. LUTTER, *Die Angleichung des Gesellschaftsrechts nach dem EWG-Vertrag*, in *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1966, p. 277 ff.; C. W.A. TIMMERMANS, *Die europäische Rechtsangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht. Eine integrations- und rechtspolitische Analyse*, in *Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländ. und internat. Privatrecht*, 1984, p. 1 ff.. More recently, see W. SCHÖN, *Mindestharmonisierung im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht*, in *Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht*, 1996, p. 221 ff.; J. WOUTERS, *European Company Law: Quo Vadis?*, in *Common Market Law Journal*, 2000, p. 257 ff.

¹⁷ See S. LOMBARDO, *Some Reflections on Freedom of Establishment of Non-profit Entities in the European Union*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2013, p. 225 ff.

¹⁸ G. BEITZKE, *Anerkennung und Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften und Juristischen Personen im EWG-Bereich*, in *Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht*, 1964, p. 1 ff.

In its essential terms, there was a compatibility problem between the real seat theory and Articles 52 and 58 EEC Treaty. Real seat Member States did not recognize a company with its registered office in a Member State that adopted the incorporation theory but which then moved its real seat to their territory. These real seat Member States for recognition purposes required that the real seat and registered office of the Member State of formation coincide, so neglecting the issue of initial valid formation in the Member State of origin/formation (i.e. the one of incorporation).²⁰

The problem of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies according to the relevant EEC Treaty Articles was furthermore complicated by the importance legal scholars were giving to Article 54(3)(g). This Article provides for coordination of the national company law provisions of Member States.²¹ Under Article 54(3)(g), harmonization of company law was long considered functional and instrumental to the complete realization of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies needed to reach the goal of a single market. Indeed, as in other areas of law, *ex ante* harmonization was commonly considered to be a prerequisite to allow and realize the exercise of the rights established by the Treaty. Only after some decades, were doubts raised by some legal scholars about the paradigm of harmonization of company law as a mechanism to reach integration of the internal market and mobility of companies.²²

3. *The American market for corporate charters*

The legal situation in Europe was for a long time different from the one in the United States, where the incorporation theory developed as

¹⁹ P. BEHRENS, *Die grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften in der EWG*, in *Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts*, 1989, p. 354 ff.

²⁰ See M. LUTTER, *op. cit.*

²¹ See H. KÖTZ, *Rechtsvereinheitlichung – Nutzen, Kosten, Methoden, Ziele*, in *Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländ. und internat. Privatrecht*, 1986, p. 1 ff.; P. BEHRENS, *Voraussetzungen und Grenzen der Rechtsfortbildung durch Rechtsvereinheitlichung*, in *Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländ. und internat. Privatrecht*, 1986, p. 19 ff.; P. BEHRENS, *Krisensymptome in der Gesellschaftsrechtangleichung*, in *FS Mästmäcker*, U. IMMENGA, W. MÖSCHEL, D. REUTER (Hrsg.), Baden Baden, 1986, p. 831 ff.; K.J. HOPT, *Company Law in the European Union: Harmonization or Subsidiarity?* Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, Roma, 1998.

the conflict of law rule for corporations applied by almost all States and where the predominance of Delaware as the State of (re)incorporation emerged quite early in time.²³ Delaware's predominance, possibly historically threatened by federal law,²⁴ was actually strongly criticized by some legal scholars in terms of "race to laxity" or "race to the bottom", but it was never the object of intervention by federal legislation that covered the entire spectrum of corporate law.²⁵ More recently, the predominance of Delaware was positively reassessed, after the findings of empirical studies on the possible positive effects of reincorporation of companies to Delaware.²⁶

To understand the major points of the more recent positive (re)evaluation of the Delaware predominance, it is useful to briefly describe the terms of the law and economics debate that developed in the United States.^{27,28} Starting point for the analysis of the market for

²² See E.R. LATTY, *Pseudo-Foreign Corporations*, in *Yale Law Journal*, 1955, p. 137 ff.; P.J. KOZYRIS, *Corporate Wars and Choice of Law*, in *Duke Law Journal*, 1985, p. 1 ff.; R.M. BUXBAUM, *The Origins of the American >>Internal Affairs<< Rule in the Corporate Conflict of Laws*, in *FS Kegel*, H.-J. MUSIELAK, K. SCHURIG (Hrsg.), Stuttgart, 1987, p. 55 ff. From a comparative perspective, see also R.M. BUXBAUM, K.J. HOPT, *Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A.*, Berlin, 1988.

²³ M.J. ROE, *Delaware's Competition*, in *Harvard Law Review*, 2003, p. 588 ff.

²⁴ See H.L.F. WILGUS, *Need of a National Incorporation Law*, in *Michigan Law Review*, 1904, p. 358 ff.; W.L. CARY, *Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware*, in *Yale Law Journal*, 1974, p. 663 ff.; NOTE, *Federal Chartering of Corporations. A Proposal*, in *Georgetown Law Journal*, 1972, p. 89 ff. and NOTE, *Federal Chartering of Corporations. Constitutional Challenges*, in *Georgetown Law Journal*, 1972, p. 123 ff.

²⁵ See R. ROMANO, *Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle*, in *J. of Law, Econ., & Organization*, 1985, p. 225 ff. and R. ROMANO, *The Genius of American Corporate Law*, Washington, 1993; see also R.K. WINTER JR., *State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation*, in *Journal of Legal Studies*, 1977, p. 251 ff.

²⁶ A complete analysis of the debate on regulatory competition in the US is outside the scope of this article, see M. KAHN, *The State of State Competition for Incorporation*, in ECGI Law WP 263/2014.

²⁷ Law and economics has characterized the development of US corporate scholarship in the last 40 years while in Europe this paradigm is comparatively less developed. For some considerations for the US, see R. ROMANO, *The Making of Contemporary Corporate Law Scholarship*, in *FS Baums*, H. SIEKMANN (Hrsg.), Tübingen, 2017, p. 991 ff.

corporate charters is that the firm is an alternative mechanism for allocating resources than the market, owing to the different patterns of transaction costs that exist between the two mechanisms.²⁹ The corporation is considered to be a nexus of contracts between several parties (patrons) generating agency problems and agency costs.³⁰ In particular, according to a taxonomy of the different types of firms,³¹ the transaction costs arising from the interaction of the different patrons (shareholders, creditors, employees, customers) using the firm are of two types: the costs of contracting and the costs of ownership.³² More in particular, contracting costs include several types (due to classical market failures such as monopoly power, opportunistic behavior and asymmetric information) while ownership costs (meaning the residual right of control and the residual right of earning) include the costs of controlling managers, the costs of collective decision making and the costs of risk bearing.³³

Ownership of the firm is efficiently assigned to a particular group of patrons in a way that “minimizes the total costs of transactions between the firm and all of its patrons”.³⁴ The business corporation is characterized by the efficient assignment of ownership to shareholders because this reduces the total transaction costs of the entire nexus.³⁵

In such a context, where the allocation of ownership to shareholders is justified in terms of better management control and common objective of shareholder value, the US market for corporate charters apparently reduces the costs of ownership and for this reason is

²⁸ R.H. COASE, *The Nature of the Firm*, in *Economica*, 1937, p. 386 ff.

²⁹ A. ALCHIAN, H. DEMSTETZ, *Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization*, in *American Economic Review*, 1972, p. 777 ff. and M. JENSEN, W. H. MECKLING, *Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure*, in *Journal of Financial Economics*, 1976, p. 305 ff.

³⁰ H. HANSMANN, *The Ownership of the Firm*, in *J. of Law, Econ. & Organization*, 1988, p. 267 ff.; see also H. HANSMANN, *The Ownership of Enterprise*, Harvard, 1996, 11.

³¹ H. HANSMANN, *The Ownership of Enterprise*, cit., 18.

³² H. HANSMANN, *The Ownership of Enterprise*, cit. 24 and 35, and 53 for the investor-owned firm. The relationship between the different agency costs a corporation creates and the possible legal instruments to deal with them is analysed in R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., *The Anatomy of Corporate Law*, Oxford, 2009.

³³ H. HANSMANN, *The Ownership of Enterprise*, cit., 21.

³⁴ H. HANSMANN, *The Ownership of Enterprise*, cit., 21.

efficient.³⁶ Indeed, the implicit logic of the US market for corporate charters is that a (re)incorporation to Delaware increases the value of the corporation, meaning that ownership costs are comparatively reduced.³⁷ At the same time, a (re)incorporation to Delaware does not increase the costs of credit, i.e. the second most important costs a corporation, as a firm, faces. This is the economic core of the American market for corporate charters in terms of ownership costs vs credit costs. Delaware law, by reducing the costs of ownership (particularly significant in large corporations with disperse ownership where the shareholders-managers agency problem dominates) and by not increasing the costs of credit, produces apparently a surplus in terms of share value that shareholders/investors are willing to pay.³⁸

The reconstruction of the Delaware predominance in the market for corporate charters requires some qualifications for the limited purposes of this article; some of them belong to the realm of corporate law, while others are outside it and cover securities regulation and bankruptcy law. All these qualifications are essential for comparative purposes with the European market for corporate charters.

There are three points related to the nature of corporate law worth mentioning. The first is the central element that, given the theoretical model of reference, in the USA, corporate law is (considered to be only) the relationship between shareholders and managers.³⁹ There is no

³⁵ The extent to which regulatory competition is able or not to reach the *optimal* regulatory result is debated and doubted in a famous article by L.A. BEBCHUCK, *Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law*, in *Harvard Law Review*, 1992, p. 105 ff.

³⁶ A complete overview of the empirical findings is provided by M. KAHN, *op. cit.*, 19.

³⁷ The following example is useful. Imagine a corporation is incorporated in the State of Arizona with the total costs of \$100: cost of ownership \$80 and costs of credit \$20. A reincorporation to Delaware means an increase in the stock value, because the costs of ownership become \$76 (because of the better corporate law) while the costs of credit remains constant. The total costs of the Delaware incorporated firm are now \$96 with an efficiency gain of \$4.

³⁸ R. ROMANO, *The Genius of American Corporate Law*, cit., 1, starts her book by simply stating “Corporate Law which is the relationship between shareholders and managers ...”. American corporate legal doctrine seems to be predominantly convinced that corporate law covers shareholders and managers and pursues an aim of shareholder value. For a comparative analysis of the two regulatory philosophies, see e.g. F.M. MUCCIARELLI, *The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the E.U.*, cit.; M. GELTER, *Taming or Protecting the*

space, as in Europe, for the consideration of other interests to be dealt with by corporate law. The second is that, given the concentration of corporate law on this single relationship, there is evidence that the surplus Delaware law provides predominantly comes from the quality of its judicial system.⁴⁰ The third point is that since the advantages of the Delaware corporate law are comparatively more useful in large corporations with dispersed ownership, closed corporations with a lower level of ownership costs are less interested in Delaware corporate law because the saving in ownership costs are less important. A consequence of this statement is that closed corporations (and limited liability companies) are less prone to (re)incorporate in Delaware.⁴¹ On the same logic, concentrated ownership through institutional investors, as a self-enforcing mechanism to reduce ownership costs, as in closed corporations, has been qualified as a cause for the declaration of death of (Delaware) corporate law.⁴²

There are two elements of this market for corporate law that have to be further considered for comparative purposes: bankruptcy law and securities regulation. Both areas of law are of federal competence in the United States and both areas of law are important in terms of transaction costs. This means that Delaware law reduces ownership costs for corporations with dispersed ownership (and does not increase credit costs) and that the market for corporate charters is (presumably) efficient inside this context of federal bankruptcy law and securities regulation. We do not know the extent to which the market for corporate charters would be efficient, were the two areas of law not of federal competence. Even though legal scholars have argued for competition

Modern Corporation – Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, in *New York University Journal of Law and Business*, 2011, p. 641 ff. See also G.H. ROTH, PETER KINDLER, *The Spirit of Corporate Law. Core Principles of Corporate Law in Continental Europe*, München, 2013.

³⁹ See W. SAVITT, *The Genius of the Modern Chancery System*, in *Columbia Business Law Review*, 2012, p. 570 ff.; H. FLEISCHER, *Gerichtsspezialisierung im Gesellschaftsrecht*, in *FS Baums*, H. SIEKMANN (Hrsg.), Tübingen, 2017, p. 417 ff.

⁴⁰ See J. DAMMANN, M. SCHÜNDELN, *The Incorporation Choice of Privately Held Corporations*, in *J. of Law, Econ., & Organization*, 2011, p. 79 ff. and J. DAMMANN, M. SCHÜNDELN, *Where Are Limited Liability Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis*, in *Journal of Law and Economics*, 2012, p. 741 ff.

⁴¹ See Z. GOSHEN, S. HANNES, *The Death of Corporate Law*, in *ECGI Law WP*, 402/2018.

also in these two areas, as yet we do not know the final word on this issue.⁴³

4. *The case law of the European Court of Justice*

The relevant cases dealing with freedom of establishment and mobility of companies in the European Community/Union have focused mainly on private limited liability companies or partnerships. The ECJ in the last twenty years has developed a liberal jurisprudence towards both free choice of law for first incorporations and a general principle of permissibility for reincorporations of existing companies with retention of legal personality.

Given the general rule of permissibility, the Court has applied the so-called *Gebhard*-test,⁴⁴ according to which a possible limitation to freedom of establishment and mobility of companies has to be: (i) nondiscriminatory, (ii) justified by imperative requirements in the general interest, (iii) must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective, (iv) must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. This test is applied in any case, in very restrictive terms to avoid possible limitations of the granted freedom of establishment/mobility.

The first relevant case in the jurisprudence of the ECJ was *Daily Mail* decided on September 1988.⁴⁵ *Daily Mail* was an English public limited liability company incorporated in the United Kingdom that wanted to transfer its central administration and control to the Netherlands in order to save taxes. The essential point of the four questions asked to the ECJ was whether Articles 52 and 58 EEC Treaty permit a company to transfer the central administration and control to another Member State by maintaining the registered office in the Member State of incorporation without the prior consent of tax authorities. The Court referred *Daily Mail* to a case of primary establishment and argued that “unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law,

⁴² D.A. SKEEL, *Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Bankruptcy*, in *Texas Law Review*, 1994, p. 471 ff.; R. ROMANO, *Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation*, in *Yale Law Journal*, 1998, p. 2359 ff.

⁴³ Case C-55/94, of 30 November 1995.

⁴⁴ Case C-81/87, of 27 September 1988. On *Daily Mail*, see e.g. J. LEVER, *Note*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 1989, p. 327 ff.

creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning”.⁴⁶ The Court first described the diversity in the connecting factors required by the different Member States for the creation and recognition of companies and the absence of European legislation on mobility and recognition of companies. It then argued that, to date under existing Community law, Articles 52 and 58 EECT Treaty could not be interpreted as conferring to companies a right to transfer their central administration to another Member State while maintaining their status as companies of the original Member State. *Daily Mail* had significant reverberations in the field of European company law and was mainly interpreted as a barrier to freedom of establishment and mobility of companies in the European Union.

The predominant influence of *Daily Mail*, as interpreted by the majority of legal scholars in terms of limitation to freedom of establishment, rendered the *Centros* decision of March 1999 a “revolution” in the European Union.⁴⁷ *Centros* was a mail-box private limited company incorporated in England and Wales by two Danish citizens that wished to register a branch in Denmark. The Danish authorities argued that the branch would have carried on the business activity and that *Centros* was established in the United Kingdom solely in order to circumvent mainly Danish rules on minimum capital requirements. The preliminary question referred to the ECJ by the Danish authority explicitly referred to the possibility to choose another Member State in order to register a company to do business in another Member State by way of a branch. The ECJ decided the case by covering the branch under the specific characteristics of freedom of establishment under the Treaty. Furthermore, the Court denied any importance to approximation of company law as instrumental to freedom of establishment and more importantly applied the proportionality *Gebhard*-test to the possible reasons that could limit the freedom of choosing a different Member State for incorporating a

⁴⁵ *Daily Mail*, point 19.

⁴⁶ On *Centros* see e.g., P. BEHRENS, *International Company Law in View of the Centros Decision of the ECJ*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2000, p. 125 ff.; W.-H. ROTH, *Note*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2000, p. 143 ff.

company in order to do business in another one.⁴⁸ The eco of *Centros* has been extremely significant for European company law and has opened the door to the possibility to choose a company of a Member State following the incorporation theory in order to do business in another Member State. *Centros* did in fact open up the way to regulatory competition and regulatory arbitrage in European company law and legal doctrine began to analyze this phenomenon, which in fact changed the paradigm for European company law.

The third case was *Überseering* of November 2002 and was the first referring to a real seat Member State receiving a company from an incorporation theory Member State.⁴⁹ *Überseering* was a Dutch private limited liability company that shifted its central administration and principal place of business to Germany. The German BGH asked the ECJ the extent to which the recognition of the legal capacity of *Überseering* had to be granted by German authorities. The ECJ decided that *Überseering*'s legal capacity be recognized as a Dutch company by German authorities. The Court referred to the *Daily Mail* decision for arguing the difference between the two cases. While *Daily Mail* concerned a case of permissibility of transfer from the Member State of departure, i.e. the extent to which the United Kingdom allowed its own companies to transfer the seat abroad, *Überseering* concerned the permissibility of the Member State of arrival to recognize a company validly incorporated in another Member State. Germany is not allowed under the freedom of establishment granted by the Treaty to deny recognition to a company validly incorporated in another Member State.

⁴⁷ Indeed, "national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it", point 34 of *Centros*.

⁴⁸ Case C-208/00, of 5 November 2002. On *Überseering*, see e.g. S. LOMBARDO, *Conflict of Law Rules in Company Law after Überseering: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Allocation of Policy Competence in the European Union*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2003, p. 301 ff.; E. WYMEERSCH, *The Transfer of the company seat in European company law*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2013, p. 661 ff.

The fourth case was *Inspire Art* of September 2003,⁴⁹ a private limited liability company incorporated in the register of England and Wales; the case referred to the regularity and compatibility of Dutch provisions for the registration of branches according to European provisions and in particular with the Eleventh Directive. The ECJ was asked to assess the compatibility of those provisions, including the temporary joint and several liability of directors with European rules on freedom of establishment, checking in particular their proportionality in order to protect internal economic activity. The Court maintained the exhaustive nature of the Eleventh directive provisions and argued for the non-compatibility of the Dutch provision, integrating them by applying the proportionality test to assess their validity with respect to the protection of internal economic activity.

The fifth case, *Sevic* of December 2005,⁵⁰ regarded a merger between Sevic, a German public limited company and a Luxemburg limited company. The German authorities had refused to recognize the merger, because according to German law a merger was possible only between legal entities established in Germany. The ECJ was asked to assess to what extent mergers between companies of different Member States are included in the freedom of establishment. The Court recognized that mergers between companies are an essential instrument for the creation of the single market and that freedom of establishment includes also the possibility of merger.

The sixth case was *Cartesio* of 16 December 2008.⁵¹ *Cartesio* was a Hungarian limited partnership that wanted to transfer its seat to Italy while maintaining Hungarian legal status. The ECJ was asked to assess whether freedom of establishment includes the obligation for Hungary to permit such a transfer. The Court, mainly on the basis of *Daily Mail*,

⁴⁹ Case C-167/01, of 30 September 2003. See e.g. W.F. EBKE, *The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolutions: Überseering, Inspire Art and Beyond*, in *European Business Law Review*, 2005, p. 9 ff.; D. ZIMMER, *Note*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2004, p. 1127 ff.

⁵⁰ Case C-411/03, of 13 December 2005. See e.g. P. BEHRENS, *Note*, *Common Market Law Review*, 2006, p. 1669 ff.; M.M. SIEMS, *SEVIC: Beyond Cross Border Mergers*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2007, p. 307 ff.

⁵¹ Case C-210/06, of 16 December 2008. See e.g. S. LOMBARDO, *Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the European Union after Cartesio*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2009, p. 627 ff.; M. SZYDŁO, *Note*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2009, p. 703 ff.

recognized that the Treaty does not regulate the connecting factor Member States use to register/form their companies and that *Cartesio* was not permitted to move its seat to Italy while retaining Hungarian legal status. Furthermore, in *Cartesio* the Court with an *obiter dictum* opened the door to reincorporation with change of applicable law (conversion) as a possibility included in freedom of establishment.

The seventh case, of July 2012 is *Vale*,⁵³ which was an Italian limited liability company that wanted to convert into a Hungarian company. The ECJ was asked to assess whether conversion, like merger in the *SEVIC* case, is included in the freedom of establishment. The Court again recognized conversion between companies of different Member States as an important instrument for the realization of the internal market. The provisions of the Member State of arrival regulating the cross-border conversion can be applied, but the principles of equivalence and of effectiveness have to be respected in order to avoid discrimination between national and cross-border conversions.

The last case is *Polbud*, a Polish limited liability company that wanted to convert into a Luxemburg company of the same type.⁵⁴ The Court was asked to assess the compatibility of the liquidation procedure under Polish law required to cancel the company from the Polish register in order to register the company in Luxemburg. *Polbud* concerns the compatibility of material company law rules that require the liquidation of the company necessary for cancellation from the national register in turn needed to acquire the new legal status in the Member State of arrival. The ECJ ruled that liquidation is not proportional and reasonable to protect internal interests and that freedom of establishment covers the cross-border transformation with maintenance of legal personality.

⁵² Case C-378/10, of 12 July 2012. See for example S. RAMMELOO, *Freedom of Establishment: Cross-Border Transfer of Company Seat – The Last Piece of the Puzzle*, in *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*, 2012, p. 563 ff.; T. BIERMEYER, *Shaping the space of cross-border conversions in the EU. Between right and autonomy: VALE Építési Kft*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2013, p. 571 ff.

⁵³ Case C-106/16, of 25 October 2017. See M. SZYDŁO, *Cross-border conversion of companies under freedom of establishment: Polbud and beyond*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2018, p. 1549 ff.

5. *The European market for company law in the last 20 years*

When considering a market it is useful to differentiate firstly between the demand and supply sides. With respect to (company) law it is possible to differentiate between: (i) a possible regulatory arbitrage (demand side), where parties to a contractual agreement are free to choose the applicable law (of the Member State) of their (company) contract and (ii) a possible regulatory competition (supply side), where jurisdictions (Member States) possibly compete to attract contracts/companies.⁵⁵ Secondly, in the particular market for corporate charters, another difference has typically been made, in order to properly differentiate the various problems involved. It is the one between (i) first incorporation of a company (i.e. the formation of a new company in a Member State) and (ii) reincorporation of an existing company from one Member State to another one with change of applicable law, maintenance of legal personality and avoidance of a winding up of the company entity.⁵⁶

Section 4 has shown that the legal conditions for the demand side have been progressively realized over the last twenty years by ECJ case law and are now open/ready to realize regulatory arbitrage, both in terms of first incorporations and re-incorporations. Essentially, the case law of the ECJ has extended also to company law an important principle typical of contract law, i.e. the one of freedom of choice of law.⁵⁷ The

⁵⁴ For an extreme of this paradigm and for the deconstruction of the different regulatory regimes a company could be subject to, see S. LOMBARDO, P. PASOTTI, *Disintegrating the Regulation of the Business Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts: Regulatory Competition vs Unification of Law*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2009, p. 35 ff.

⁵⁵ See e.g. S. LOMBARDO, *Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the European Community: Prerequisites and Limits*, cit., 145, 170; W. SCHÖN, *The Mobility of Companies in Europe and the Organizational Freedom of Company Founders*, cit., 134, 137.

⁵⁶ See *Centros*, point 27. The dimension of the free choice of the most important contractual parties of the nexus, i.e. the shareholders who form the company has *de facto* equalized the company to those other types of contracts for whom freedom of choice of law was already granted. Abuse of law has been considered as absent in this free choice: on the point see W.-G. RINGE, *Sparking Regulatory Competition in European Company Law: The Impact of the Centros Line of Case Law and its Concept of 'Abuse of Law'*, in *Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New Principle of EU Law?*, R. DE LA FEIRA, S. VOGENAUER (eds.), Oxford, 2011, p. 107 ff.

only limitation is the *Gebhard*-test, which is applied in very restrictive terms to avoid possible limitations to the granted freedom of establishment/mobility. Freedom of choice of law has been evaluated, from a law and economics perspective, as generally efficient in terms of giving contractual parties the possibility to gain from the choice of different substantive laws.⁵⁸

This Section examines the equilibrium of the European market for corporate charters that has developed in the last twenty years. It takes into consideration the demand side in terms of first incorporation (i.e. formation of a new company) and of reincorporation (i.e. change of applicable law of an existing company with retention of the legal personality), and the supply side.

5.1. *The demand side*

The demand side of the European market for corporate charters has mainly concerned in the last twenty years, first incorporations of private limited companies (or of closed corporations).⁵⁹ To analyze the possible efficiency gains of the European market for corporate charters, it is possible to scrutinize this result using the ownership costs vs contracting costs paradigm presented in Section 3.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ F. PARISI, L.E. RIBSTEIN, *Choice of Law*, in *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law*, P. NEWMAN (ed.), New York, 1998, p. 236 ff.

⁵⁸ There are several empirical studies on the topic of first incorporation and reincorporation of existing companies. See e.g. M. BECHT, C. MAYER, H.F. WAGNER, *Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry*, in *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 2008, p. 241 ff.; W.W. BRATTON, J. A. MCCAUREY, E.P.M. VERMUELEN, *How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking?*, in *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 2009, p. 347 ff.; R. BRAUN, H. EIDENMÜLLER, A. ENGERT, L. HORNUF, *Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law Reforms*, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2013, p. 399 ff.; W.-G. RINGE, *Corporate Mobility in the European Union – a Flash in the Pan? An empirical study on the success of lawmaking and regulatory competition*, in *European Company and Financial Law Review*, 2013, p. 230 ff.; C. GERNER-BEUERLE, F.M. MUCCIARELLI, E. SCHUSTER, M. SIEMS, *Why do business incorporate in other Member States? An empirical analysis of the role of conflict of law rules*, in *International Review of Law and Economics*, 2018, p. 14 ff.

⁵⁹ I do not take into consideration the operative costs of a first incorporation and a reincorporation in a Member State different from the hosting one. On this issue, see

a) *Ownership costs*

It is a peculiar characteristic of private limited companies that their ownership costs are low in comparison to companies with dispersed ownership, being their ownership structure also usually extremely simple in terms of limited number of involved shareholders. From this perspective, we can also argue that private limited companies generally are companies where the level of trust/knowledge is comparatively higher and transaction costs relatively lower than listed companies with dispersed ownership.⁶¹

In exploiting the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, it can be presumed, as the *Centros* case law implicitly assumes and following the general principle of freedom of choice in contract law, that shareholders, having to decide where to incorporate a new company or to re-incorporate an existing company, can legitimately consider the company law of Member State A better (i.e. reducing ownership costs) than the company law of (their) hosting Member State B. This assumption can be argued both with reference to first incorporations and to re-incorporations with a change of applicable law and retention of legal personality.

This leads to the simple result that the company law of A is efficient in comparison to the company law of B, as regards solely ownership costs. By summing the (presumed) reduction in the ownership costs in the thousands of first incorporations (and some re-incorporations) carried out to exploit regulatory arbitrage of private limited companies that the EU has experienced in these twenty years,⁶² it can be presumably assumed that the European Union has gained in efficiency

M. BECHT, L. ENRIQUES, V. KOROM, *Centros and the Cost of Branching*, in *Journal of Corporate Studies*, 2009, p. 171 ff. Furthermore, I do not consider the costs of incorporation as analyzed by M. VENTORUZZO, *Cost-Based and Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets for Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U.*, cit.

⁶⁰ For the typical agency problems of a close corporation like the private limited liability company, see P. AGSTNER, *Shareholder conflicts in close corporations: Between theory and practice. Evidence from Italian private limited liability companies*, forthcoming in *European Business Organization Law Review*.

⁶¹ According to C. GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., *Why do business incorporate in other Member States? An empirical analysis of the role of conflict of law rules*, cit., 18 about 420.000 companies are incorporated in other Member States.

terms. This simply assumption is based on the elementary argument that the micro structure of the demand side of the ownership costs of (re)-incorporations has signaled this natural development.

A counter argument, rejecting this conclusion, should place the burden of proof of demonstrating, when choosing an alternative company law for (re)incorporations, shareholders of private limited companies would *intentionally* increase their ownership costs, so reducing the efficiency of their contractual agreement. Such an argument is of course difficult to sustain and would bring to the paternalistic policy conclusion that the hosting Member State B should impede the free choice of law of shareholders for Member State A.

Given this picture, we can reach a first, major comparative conclusion for differences in the structure of ownership costs between the US and the EU. In the US market for corporate charters, the predominance of Delaware is particularly relevant for hundreds of listed companies with dispersed ownership,⁶³ where the ownerships costs are much higher in comparison to private companies, and the Delaware predominance signals a (presumed) efficiency gain (because of the reduction of those ownership costs).⁶⁴ In Europe on the contrary, it is the sum of thousands of cases of presumed savings in ownership costs of incorporations of new private limited companies (and some reincorporations) that characterizes the market for corporate charters.⁶⁵

b) Contracting costs

The costs of contracting include in particular the costs of contracts between the company and its creditors (or between the shareholders and the creditors taking the agency costs between shareholders and

⁶² According to R. ROMANO, *Law as a Product*, cit., 244, 417 out of 515 companies reincorporated to Delaware.

⁶³ An example helps to understand the argument. Imagine that, for instance, the 1,000 corporations incorporated in Delaware have a single average ownership cost saving of \$1,000: 1,000 corporations times \$1,000 makes a total saving of \$1,000,000, with the results that the product “Delaware corporate law” grants ownership cost savings for \$1,000,000 to the US system.

⁶⁴ In this case, for instance, the 20,000 private limited companies incorporated in a different Member State from the hosting one grants a single average ownership saving of €50: 20,000 companies times €50 makes a European savings in ownerships costs of € 1,000,000.

creditors)⁶⁶ and the costs of contracts between the company and its employees (or between the shareholders/creditors and the employees).⁶⁷ With respect to the second kind of costs, I will not treat the problem here because of the highly controversial nature of workers' codetermination.⁶⁸

With respect to regulatory competition in company law and creditors, legal scholars have also typically distinguished between first incorporation and reincorporation with change of applicable law,⁶⁹ and have analyzed the pros and cons of the market for corporate charters also by distinguishing between so-called adjusting creditors, i.e. those sophisticated creditors able to adjust the contractual conditions to a first incorporation or a reincorporation, and non-adjusting creditors.⁷⁰⁻⁷¹

With regards to creditors, current ECJ case law is such that an efficient result is presumed in the case of both first incorporation and reincorporation. Adopting the paradigm of analysis used in this article, taking into account also contracting costs, implies adding to the presumed average decrease of the ownership costs, either (i) the possible invariance of the costs of credit (i.e. the costs of credit do not change in case of (re)incorporation in a Member State different from the one where business is carried out) or (ii) their possible increase (i.e. the costs of credit do increase).⁷² Depending on the results of this

⁶⁵ R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., *The Anatomy of Corporate Law*, cit., 115.

⁶⁶ R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., *The Anatomy of Corporate Law*, cit., 100.

⁶⁷ See M. GELTER, *Tilting the Balance Between Capital and Labor? The Effect of Regulatory Arbitrage in European Corporate Law on Employees*, in *Fordham International Law Journal*, 2010, p. 792 ff.. Apparently, there are empirical data suggesting that where possible, German shareholders tend to escape the German codetermination system, see S. SICK, *Der deutschen Mitebestimmung entzogen: Unternehmen mit ausländischer Rechtsform nehmen zu. Umgehung der Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat durch die Nutzung von ausländischen Rechtsformen*, Report, No. 8, Hans-Böckler Stiftung, 2015.

⁶⁸ As stressed by F.M. MUCCIARELLI, *The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the E.U.*, cit.

⁶⁹ See e.g. J. ARMOUR, *Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition*, cit., 47.

⁷⁰ For an analysis of regulatory competition and creditors, see e.g. M. VENTORUZZO, *Cost-Based and Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets for Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U.*, cit., 107; F.M. MUCCIARELLI, *The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the E.U.*, cit., 454.

⁷¹ I exclude the possibility of a decrease in the costs of contracting for credit.

exercise, the total possible benefits or costs for the complex of (re)incorporations in the European internal market should emerge.⁷³

However, a complication in this exercise emerges because the regulatory arbitrage for saving in ownership costs has determined an apparent relaxation of legal capital rules for private limited companies in several Member States.⁷⁴ The extent to which this development has decreased or increased *per se* the costs of credit is nevertheless difficult to assess. The effects of regulatory arbitrage on developments in the minimum legal capital rules of some Member States for private limited companies leads us to another more general consideration with respect to the relation between company law and insolvency law in terms of creditors' protection.⁷⁵ While EU Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings regulates cross-border insolvencies in a procedural way,⁷⁶ the possible tension between freedom of establishment and resulting applicable company law and insolvency law has been treated by the ECJ in the *Kornhass* case of December 2015.⁷⁷ The Court decided that the substantive insolvency law (rules on directors' liability) of the hosting Member State B (Germany) can be applied to a company incorporated in another Member State A (UK).⁷⁸ More in particular, as regards the

⁷² I stress that I am considering the issue from the perspective of theory without attempting here to provide an answer to the question.

⁷³ See the comparative experiences of some Member States as provided in the contributions in A.J. VIERA GONZÁLEZ, C. TEICHEMANN, (eds.) *Private Company Law reform in Europe: The Race for Flexibility*, Toronto, 2015. See also ARMOUR ET AL., *Brexit and Corporate Citizenship*, cit., Table 1.

⁷⁴ See C. GERNER-BEUERLE, E. SCHUSTER, *The Costs of Separation: Friction Between Company and Insolvency Law in the Single Market*, in *Journal of Corporate Law Studies*, 20014, p. 287 ff.

⁷⁵ See F.M. MUCCIARELLI, *Private International Law Rules in the Insolvency Regulation Recast: A reform or a Restatement of the Status Quo?* In *European Company and Financial Law Review*, 2016, p. 1 ff.

⁷⁶ See G. LINDEMANS, *The Walls Have Fallen, Run for the Keep: Insolvency Law as the New Company Law for Third Parties*, in *European Review of Private Law*, 2016, p. 877 ff.; M. SZYDŁO, *Directors' duties and liability in insolvency and the freedom of establishment of companies after Kornhaas*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2017, p. 1853 ff.

⁷⁸ The extent to which the liability rule belongs to corporate law or insolvency law is discussed by W.-G. RINGE, *Kornhaas and the Challenge of Applying Keck in Establishment*, in *European Law Review*, 2017, p. 270 ff. who also criticizes the decision.

possible tension arising between company law and insolvency law in the area of creditor protection, the ECJ judged that in the pathological phase of the business the insolvency law of the hosting Member State B should prevail, while in the physiological phase of the business (and the formation of the company) it should be the company law rules of the home Member State A freely chosen by shareholders and contractual creditors. The Court does not clarify all the possible consequences of integrating the company law of home Member State A with the insolvency law of hosting Member State B in terms of the substantive rules concerned, but simply assumes this possible integration as the basis for fruitful future collaboration.⁷⁹

Here it is not possible to assess these consequences particularly in terms of the possible effects such a decision may have for the European market for corporate charters. The central question of *Kornhass* from the perspective of the demand side is whether the *ex ante* incentives of shareholders to choose a particular company law for the physiological phase of the business are modified by a possible *ex post* application of the insolvency rules for the pathological phase of the business to protect creditors of the hosting member State.⁸⁰

5.2 *The supply side*

The supply side of the European market for corporate charters relates to the possible reaction of Member States to the regulatory arbitrage opened up by the case law of the ECJ, or in other words the extent to which regulatory arbitrage from the demand side generates a response from Member States, which having lost companies, decide to win back market position. While the public limited company has traditionally been harmonized more deeply,⁸¹ the private limited company has proved to be more resistant to harmonization efforts probably both for

⁷⁸ For a possible extension of *Kornhass* also to shareholders' liability, see A. KRAWCZYK-GIEHSMANN, *Shareholders' Liability for Ruining a Company in Light of the CCEU's Judgment in Kornhaas*, forthcoming in *European Business Organization Law Review*.

⁷⁹ On the point see also G. LINDEMANS, *The Walls Have Fallen, Run for the Keep: Insolvency Law as the New Company Law for Third Parties*, cit., 888.

⁸⁰ Despite being argued in a trivial way by L. ENRIQUES, *EC Company Law Directives*, cit.

political and practical reasons. Legal scholarship was initially uncertain about how Member States would react to the threat of regulatory arbitrage. After twenty years, it is possible to say that regulatory competition by Member States has been solely defensive as Member States do not appear to be actively competing in making their countries more attractive for companies.⁸² The private limited company has been reformed in several Member States in response to regulatory arbitrage on the demand side by relaxing minimum capital requirements for private limited companies.⁸³ This development, though the object of conflicting evaluations, has characterized the market for corporate charters.⁸⁴ On the other hand, the European Union has created the European Company and the European Cooperative Company, which have proved to be in some way complementary to national companies and have increased the number of entities destined to business activity.⁸⁵

6. Conclusions

This article has provided an overview of the issue of freedom of establishment and the main developments of the European market for corporate charters, following the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the field of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies. Both for first incorporation and reincorporations of existing companies, the case law of the ECJ has proved to be essential in giving the demand side the possibility to freely choose the applicable law. The demand side has indeed reacted positively to the opportunities on offer, which has concerned mainly private limited companies. From the supply side perspective, Member States have responded to the new challenges,

⁸¹ A. ZORZI, *A European Nevada? Bad Enforcement as an Edge in State Competition for Incorporations*, in *European Business Organization Law Review*, 2017, p. 251 ff.

⁸² For the evolution of minimum capital requirements, see J. ARMOUR ET AL., *Brexit and Corporate Citizenship*, cit., Table 1.

⁸³ On the debate on legal capital, see M. MIOLA, *Legal Capital and Limited Liability Companies: The European Perspective*, in *European Company and Financial Law Review*, 2006, p. 413 ff.

⁸⁴ For the new forms (in force and the possible new ones) see H. FLEISCHER, *Supranational Corporate Forms in the European Union: Prolegomena to a Theory on Supranational Forms of Associations*, in *Common Market Law Review*, 2010, p. 1617 ff.; R. GHETTI, *Unification, Harmonisation and Competition in European Company Forms*, in *European Business Law Review*, 2018, p. 813 ff.

particularly with respect to the relaxation of minimal capital requirements of private limited liability companies. The *Kornhaas* case of 2015 has however complicated the picture of the European market for corporate charters with a paradoxical result. Indeed, twenty years after *Centros*, the real seat theory, which claimed the need for a single regulatory regime for ownership and contracting costs based in the hosting Member State, appears outdated. Nonetheless, the real seat theory has gained new momentum for the protection of creditors by switching from company law to insolvency law as the source of solutions to possible problems. Only the future will tell whether a frictionless coordination between company law and insolvency law is possible as implicitly assumed by the Court and whether this new regime will modify the incentives for a free choice of company law in a systematic way

